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What podcasters are saying about Private equity
Summary
In the past 30 days, 23 speakers on 18 finance podcasts discussed Private equity in 40 views. Chorus has followed Private equity since September 22, 2026: 42 views from 24 speakers on 19 shows.
Who talks about it most
- Scott Ramsower · 13
- Kim Hernas · 3
- Danny Moses · 2
- Andrew McDermott · 2
- Steve Eisman · 2
- Gabe Stengel · 2
- Ivy Zelman · 1
- Vincent Daniel · 1
- Dean Curnutt · 1
- Randy Cohen · 1
The latest views
Newest first. Every quote is checked against the episode's transcript.
Ivy Zelman · Zelman & Associates (a Walker & Dunlop company)
Private equity land-banking investors will likely have to accept returns lower than they were promised.
Public builders have moved to a land-light model, so private equity firms now supply the capital for land banking, roughly $35 billion in this market. Land prices are sticky and builders are pulling back on starts. Zelman expects land banking investors to come to grips with returns below what was promised unless something changes, and she cannot identify what would stop that.
“And they're probably going to have to come to grips with their returns are going be lower than they were promised.”at 11:45
Wealthion: Housing Weakness is spreading to luxury buyers | Ivy Zelman ·
Danny Moses · Moses Ventures
PE has drawn the risk outside banks where it cannot be monitored, and needs exits to return capital.
Danny says private equity firms have attracted the flows since the banks have been constrained by regulation. As a result, a lot of the risk now sits outside the banking system and cannot be monitored. He notes that PE firms need realizations to generate large returns of capital, and that banks need those exits, through IPOs and M&A, to earn fees. He says this makes the system interconnected, with a similar dynamic to how banks' warehouse lines once fed mortgage products before the GFC.
“But thank goodness that they've been unable to trip on themselves right now. And fortunately or unfortunately, the PE firms got the flows. And so we're sitting again in a situation where a lot of the risk is outside of the banking system instead of inside the banking system, but it can't be monitored.”at 13:05
On The Tape with Danny Moses: Lessons From The Great Financial Crisis | "Clear Takes" with Vincent Daniel and Danny Moses ·
Vincent Daniel · Seawolf Capital
Private equity pools funding AI initiatives are where write-downs and defaults would surface first.
Vincent says there are pockets where banks lend to private equity vehicles, and large brokerage firms also have significant private equity exposure. He believes the private equity pools funding many AI initiatives are where potential write-downs and defaults would appear. He explicitly says he is not calling for this right now. He is simply identifying where he believes the exposure lies.
“it's really those private equity pools that are funding a lot of the AI initiatives is where we would see potential write downs, defaults. I'm not calling for it right now.”at 16:32
On The Tape with Danny Moses: Lessons From The Great Financial Crisis | "Clear Takes" with Vincent Daniel and Danny Moses ·
Kim Hernas · J.P. Morgan
Evergreen and retail funds are stretching sponsor holding periods well beyond the usual three to five years.
Hernas says the rise of evergreen vehicles and retail funds has changed the investment horizon. An exit timeline that used to be three to five years out could now be much, much longer. That changes how sponsors think about financing their funds and assets, and how they manage risk at entry and exit.
“So we've seen a rise of evergreen vehicles, retail funds. That means that where an exit timeline might have been for an investment historically three to five years away, now it could be much, much longer.”at 2:23
J.P. Morgan Making Sense: Sponsors, spreads and stress testing: Navigating 2026’s rate reset ·
Kim Hernas · J.P. Morgan
Sponsors now combine GP, fund and asset financing to unlock liquidity, rather than treating them separately.
Hernas says sponsors used to treat financing at the GP, fund and asset levels as three discrete conversations. They now think about all three interchangeably and look for ways to combine the value held at each level, from the GP balance sheet to fund investments to individual assets. This coordination is how sponsors unlock value and find liquidity, including through back leverage.
“for sponsors, they're thinking about financing across the GP, the fund, and the asset, and sometimes interchangeably. So where those were three discrete conversations, we're now having more conversations on how do I unlock value”at 2:59
J.P. Morgan Making Sense: Sponsors, spreads and stress testing: Navigating 2026’s rate reset ·
Kim Hernas · J.P. Morgan
Deal-contingent hedging is rising around acquisitions and exits to protect modeled investment value.
Hernas says sponsors have increasingly used deal-contingent hedges, which are tied to a specific acquisition or the exit of an asset. The aim is to protect the value assumed in the sponsor's models. This has become more prevalent in the market and more top of mind for sponsors.
“we've certainly seen an increase in what we'll call kind of deal contingent hedging or hedging that exists, which is very specific to either an acquisition or an exit of an asset. How do I protect the value that I've assumed in my models around an investment has become certainly more prevalent in the market”at 6:15
J.P. Morgan Making Sense: Sponsors, spreads and stress testing: Navigating 2026’s rate reset ·
Randy Cohen · Harvard Business School
PE outperforms public markets through inside information and operational improvements net of control premiums.
PE does better than a public-market investor could replicate for two reasons. First, PE funds have inside information on companies that public investors never receive, and trading on it would be illegal anyway. Second, PE can make operational improvements to companies. Against that, PE pays a control premium to gain control, but Cohen argues the net of operational gains minus the control premium still leaves something for investors, so PE is outperforming.
“PE has edge from inside information. They have edge from the net of operational improvements minus the control premium.”at 35:15
Alpha Exchange: Randy Cohen, Professor of Entrepreneurship & Finance Harvard Business School Co-Founder, PEO Partners ·
Dean Curnutt · Macro Risk Advisors
PE's smoothed returns are a bug, not a free benefit, and investors must watch mark-to-market risk.
Curnutt agrees with the 'volatility laundering' label for PE's smoothed reported returns. He says Cliff Asness calls the smoothing a feature rather than a bug, but Curnutt argues it is a bug and that it is hard to believe investors are getting something for free from it. As a derivatives-focused investor, he says the mark-to-market risk that smoothing hides is what matters most.
“Cliff will also say it's become a feature, not a bug, but it is a bug. It's hard to look at that and think that you're really getting something for free.”at 38:04
Alpha Exchange: Randy Cohen, Professor of Entrepreneurship & Finance Harvard Business School Co-Founder, PEO Partners ·
Andrew McDermott · Mission Value Partners
PE's leverage-and-strip model hollowed out US industry, and its deal flow is now struggling.
He traces the shift from making things to financial engineering to KKR's 1980s HUDI buyout, which he says bankrupted the US machine tool industry. He says the latest jobs report showed manufacturing jobs rising strongly and finance jobs falling. He observes that PE and private credit are struggling to generate the deal flow they had in the past. He calls the model a misallocation of capital and says the industry should rethink its work.
“the private equity and private credit markets are struggling to generate the sort of deal flow that they've had in the past.”at 20:15
Top Traders Unplugged: GM109: Why Buffett Finally Went All In on Japan ft. Andrew McDermott ·
Andrew McDermott · Mission Value Partners
Japan risks becoming a KKR-style private equity portfolio, a major risk to Japanese companies.
Andrew argues that investors are betting Japan will change through activist and private equity investors. He thinks foreign shareholders own about 35% of the Japanese market but mostly focus on China, not Japan. In this context, he sees a real risk that Japan's companies end up owned and run as private-equity-style portfolios, rather than through the company-led reform he argues is actually working.
“Not that China becomes more like Japan, but that Japan becomes more like KKR's portfolio, and it's a huge risk.”at 44:28
Top Traders Unplugged: GM109: Why Buffett Finally Went All In on Japan ft. Andrew McDermott ·
Elizabeth Burton · Fortress Investment Group
Private equity is not a great setup: high rates are hurting software buyouts made in the low-rate era.
Burton says the setup is not good for private equity. Her evidence is a Wall Street Journal report that high rates are weighing on businesses bought during the low-rate era, especially concentrated software bets. The point is that the debt used for those deals now costs much more to service.
“I certainly would say it's not a great setup for private equity. ... high rates are just taking their toll on a lot of businesses that were bought during the low rate era in software, a lot of concentrated bets there.”at 7:45
CNBC Power Lunch: Energy Secretary Interview, Low-Beta Stock Picks, Nucor CEO Exclusive 10/27/26 ·
Lyn Alden · Lyn Alden Investment Strategy
Private equity's leveraged buy-and-flip model has a high failure rate and is unsuited to the end of falling rates.
Alden describes the PE playbook as buying a business, levering it up on ever-cheaper debt during roughly forty years of declining interest rates, cutting staff, and flipping the company within a few years. This maximizes near-term profit but pulls profits forward and leaves the business weaker ten or twenty years later. She uses veterinary clinics as an example, where cross-selling, service cuts and price increases follow acquisition. She says the falling-rate era that made this work is now over, and that PE companies have a larger than average failure rate because they are loaded with debt and lose their core quality. She attributes this to incentive structures built around a roughly ten-year fund life rather than to bad faith.
“a lot of private equity businesses have that outcome, whereas it's geared more toward the spreadsheet. And private equity companies have a larger than average failure rate, because they get loaded up with debt and have some of their kind of soul ripped out.”at 40:59
Wealthion: The Treasury’s Gold Revaluation Play | Lyn Alden ·
Monica Guerra · Morgan Stanley Wealth Management
Democratic scrutiny of private equity, especially in healthcare, brings headline risk but not lasting fundamental damage.
Guerra sees the private equity space as an opportunity where bad political news could be good news for investors who stay in quality names. A Democratic-led Congress would likely drill down on the sector with hearings and more investigation, particularly in healthcare, where PE firms may face scrutiny. She says PE firms will work through their margin-improvement playbook, using this period in Congress as a testing ground for what will work in 2028 and 2029. Because legislation will be hard to pass, a negative headline does not necessarily mean negative fundamentals.
“news could be good news opportunity is in the private equity space. If you're staying up in quality, you're gonna have a democratic government that's gonna essentially drill down, maybe have hearings, do more exploration... you may get a negative headline, but it doesn't necessarily mean negative fundamentals”at 41:09
CNBC Power Lunch: Previewing Big Tech Earnings, Anthropic IPO Announcement, Countdown to Midterms 10/26/26 ·
Scott Ramsower · Teacher Retirement System of Texas
CVs have conflicted pricing: the GP sits on both sides, so price and competitive process are hard to verify.
The GP acts as agent for the selling legacy LPs and, functionally, for the incoming CV investors. That dual role makes it hard for LPs to know whether the price is real or whether a competitive process was run. Scott calls this the main and original LP concern about CVs. The best-practice response he describes is requesting full bid transparency (for example, a higher bidder who pays 90 cents versus a lower bidder who pays 89 cents but commits to the GP's next fund) and treating third-party fairness opinions as only a limited check.
“The GP sits on both sides of the trade. They act as the agent for the seller, which is the legacy LPs. Functionally, they also act as the agent for the buyer, which is the incoming CV investors. That makes it hard to know whether the price is real, whether a competitive process was run.”at 11:58
Capital Allocators: Continuation Vehicles from the LP Seat – Scott Ramsower (EP.523) ·
Scott Ramsower · Teacher Retirement System of Texas
Every hour a GP spends on a CV is an hour not spent on the commingled fund LPs committed to.
CVs dilute the GP's mind share. Time spent on a CV is time not spent on the commingled fund that LPs committed capital to, and this matters even for LPs who do not invest in the CV. Scott also argues that a CV creates a new revenue stream of management fees and carry that lets the GP win even when the original fund loses, which breaks the goal of perfect alignment where LPs win only when the GP wins.
“Every hour a GP spends managing a CV is an hour they're not spending managing my commingled fund, the fund to which I committed capital. I may be an investor in that CV, but if I'm not, I'm losing their mind share.”at 15:42
Capital Allocators: Continuation Vehicles from the LP Seat – Scott Ramsower (EP.523) ·
Scott Ramsower · Teacher Retirement System of Texas
Rolling into a CV can raise LPs' fees and carry on the same asset, a worse economic deal.
A headline management fee cut does not mean lower cost. Scott's worked example: a GP bought an asset at $100 and sells it to the CV at $300. The LP who rolls now pays a 70 basis point fee on a $300 cost basis, which is more than the 100 basis points on $100 the LP was paying in the original fund. Tiered carry can also leave carry above what the original fund charged. Scott says the GP should bear the burden of ensuring rolling LPs are economically no worse off, which he calls an economic status quo.
“The GP maybe bought the asset originally at a $100. They're gonna sell it to the CV at $300. Your new cost basis is $300, but LP is now paying 70 basis points on $300, which is higher than a 100 basis points of $100.”at 17:54
Capital Allocators: Continuation Vehicles from the LP Seat – Scott Ramsower (EP.523) ·
Scott Ramsower · Teacher Retirement System of Texas
LPs often cannot truly choose to roll a CV; short election windows and approvals force selling.
CVs are presented as an LP choice to roll or sell, but many LPs cannot act on it. Board approval processes can take longer than the CV window, legal teams may lack bandwidth for review, and election windows are often only 20 to 30 business days. Other priorities can also crowd it out. Because of this, many LPs' only real option is to sell, which Scott finds concerning.
“A lot of LPs for a variety of reasons don't have that choice. They may have a board approval process that takes longer than the CV process allows for. ... The election windows oftentimes can be short twenty to thirty business days.”at 18:35
Capital Allocators: Continuation Vehicles from the LP Seat – Scott Ramsower (EP.523) ·
Scott Ramsower · Teacher Retirement System of Texas
CVs lock in DPI and IRR for the original fund before value creation ends, flattering the GP's track record.
When the commingled fund sells an asset to a CV, it produces DPI and IRR for that fund, even though the GP is still managing the asset and the true value creation is not finished. This makes the GP's track record look better as a result of a conflicted transaction. Scott notes that LPs present these higher DPIs to their investment committees, and his team strips out this synthetic DPI from CVs and NAV loans when evaluating managers.
“Even though the asset is ongoing and the GP is still managing it, it has locked in DPI and IRR for the fund even though the true value creation is not yet done. As a result, the GP's track record arguably is improved through this conflicted transaction.”at 19:25
Capital Allocators: Continuation Vehicles from the LP Seat – Scott Ramsower (EP.523) ·
Scott Ramsower · Teacher Retirement System of Texas
A CV track record cannot win at investment committee: too good looks underpriced, too bad looks like poor judgment.
Texas Teachers shows the full track record, including CVs, to its investment committee. A strong CV record makes the committee suspect the GP sold too cheaply and that a fair process was not run. A weak CV record makes the committee question the GP's investment judgment in continuing to hold the asset. Scott says this leaves CVs structurally unable to outperform by much or underperform by much, a healthy tension he sees in the limited data, which is still early.
“it's almost a no win when we show the CV track record. If you walk in with a CV track record that's too good, you would think they'd be excited because it is still an investment judgment. And our investment committee is upset because they think if it did that well, they sold it for too cheap.”at 20:34
Capital Allocators: Continuation Vehicles from the LP Seat – Scott Ramsower (EP.523) ·
Scott Ramsower · Teacher Retirement System of Texas
CVs let GPs drop the exit decision and hand it to LPs, while LPs still pay two-and-twenty.
LPs pay a GP roughly two and twenty for three judgments: sourcing and evaluating investments, creating value in them, and exiting them. If a GP CVs every asset, it gives up the exit judgment as a conflicted party and leaves the decision to the LP, while LPs are not paying any less for taking the decision back in-house. Scott says the fee rate should be renegotiated, but acknowledges this is idealistic. The infrastructure around the two-and-twenty model makes change slow, so he presents it as a point to raise with GPs rather than a near-term outcome.
“If you take CVs to their logical extreme and a GP CVs every asset in its fund, it's thrown its hands up on the third and said, I'm conflicted. I can no longer make the exit determination. LP, it's your decision. That's fine, but I paid [a] GP to do three things. You're only doing two of those.”at 22:24
Capital Allocators: Continuation Vehicles from the LP Seat – Scott Ramsower (EP.523) ·
Scott Ramsower · Teacher Retirement System of Texas
CVs cannibalize fee-free co-investment, pushing deals into fee-paying vehicles that LPs must roll into.
Historically, a sale to another GP would have required co-investment, and US buyout co-invest is no fee, no carry. CVs take those deals out of the co-invest pipeline and turn fee-free co-invest into fee-paying co-invest through a CV. Scott has seen deals that would have gone to another sponsor, not an IPO or strategic sale, now moving into CVs. LPs who co-invested in the original deal and are allowed to reinvest must do so via the CV at full fees and carry, or exit at no fee.
“The market for buyout co investment, at least in The US is no fee, no carry. This has effectively been taken out of the co invest pipeline. This is effectively cannibalizing fee free co invest because now it's fee paying co invest via a CV vehicle.”at 23:39
Capital Allocators: Continuation Vehicles from the LP Seat – Scott Ramsower (EP.523) ·
Scott Ramsower · Teacher Retirement System of Texas
CVs sell top assets early at low underwritten multiples, forfeiting the LP right-tail upside.
GPs often create CVs once an asset reaches 3x, 5x or higher inside the fund. Most CVs Scott sees are underwritten to only about another 2x. His example is an asset sold at 5x out of the fund and underwritten at 2x in the CV; had it stayed in the original fund it would have been a 10x deal. The right-tail skew of the best assets is the core reason LPs invest in private equity, so moving those assets into standalone CVs at lower underwritten returns frustrates LPs who are only exposed to the original fund.
“most CVs I've seen are underwritten to at least another two x. This is an asset that was sold at a five x out of the fund, is being underwritten at a two x in a CV. Had that stay in the original fund, that would have been a 10 x deal.”at 25:27
Capital Allocators: Continuation Vehicles from the LP Seat – Scott Ramsower (EP.523) ·
Scott Ramsower · Teacher Retirement System of Texas
If CVs spread industry-wide, best assets leave commingled funds and could pressure PE returns broadly.
Extending the right-tail argument across the whole industry, Scott says CVs could put downward pressure on private equity returns. The best assets are being systematically taken out of commingled funds and moved into standalone CVs before their final exit and before the value creation story is over. He cites data suggesting LPs are selling more than they are rolling, which leaves the LPs who are only exposed to the original fund without access to the outsized returns. The point is framed as a possibility ('could') rather than an established fact.
“If you take that last philosophy and you apply it across the whole industry, CVs could have downward pressure on private equity returns industry wide. These best assets are being systematically taken out of commingled funds and moved into standalone CVs before their final exit.”at 26:02
Capital Allocators: Continuation Vehicles from the LP Seat – Scott Ramsower (EP.523) ·
Scott Ramsower · Teacher Retirement System of Texas
CVs cannot solve the zombie fund backlog; stranded assets far exceed CV capital, so the drag lasts years.
Scott describes zombie funds as ones that have stopped making new deals and cannot raise capital, with no growth in assets. Survey data he cites shows 54% of LPs expect more zombie funds in their portfolios in two years, up from 28% two years earlier. The root cause is a structural vintage problem: 2018 to 2022 vintages deployed capital in a low-rate, high-multiple environment and could not exit in time, and the math no longer works on exits. CVs mostly kick the can down the road. There are far more stranded assets than capital for CVs, and the economics are misaligned because GPs keep collecting fees on NAV that has not converted to cash.
“They were not able to exit those deals in time. That environment no longer exists. The math doesn't work on exits. As a result, there's a structural DPI problem. That backlog is gonna take years to work through the system.”at 30:42
Capital Allocators: Continuation Vehicles from the LP Seat – Scott Ramsower (EP.523) ·
Scott Ramsower · Teacher Retirement System of Texas
Held-at-cost PE deals no longer reliably reach 2x; unrealized portfolios now need deeper underwriting.
When markets were rising, a private equity deal held at cost was assumed to reach 2x, but that is harder to assume now. Because of this, Texas Teachers is underwriting unrealized portfolios far more deeply: checking the entry multiple paid, EBITDA and revenue trajectories since entry, actual versus budget asset by asset, current leverage, where the portfolio's credits trade, and where secondary bids for LP interests are trading. He notes there is much less liquidity and far fewer distributions, and a much larger unrealized portfolio to assess.
“It was easy to assume when markets were up into the right that a deal held at cost would get to two x. That's harder to assume now.”at 37:24
Capital Allocators: Continuation Vehicles from the LP Seat – Scott Ramsower (EP.523) ·
Scott Ramsower · Teacher Retirement System of Texas
Many PE GP partnerships are untested after a decade-plus boom; cracks surface when deals underperform.
Texas Teachers is assessing whether GP partnerships will hold together when conditions get tough. Partners get along easily in good times, but partnership cracks show up when a deal underperforms, when carry is at risk, when a next fund comes in smaller than expected, or when staff must be let go. He argues many partnerships have not been tested because the last ten to fifteen years were good for private equity and many firms were founded in that period, so partnership dynamics are now a significant part of underwriting.
“A lot of these partnerships haven't been tested. The last ten, fifteen years have been good times for the private equity industry.”at 39:03
Capital Allocators: Continuation Vehicles from the LP Seat – Scott Ramsower (EP.523) ·
Owen Zidar · Princeton University
PE cost-cutting that degrades service quality creates entry opportunities for new competitors and young operators.
Private equity buyers often look for cost cuts that can make a product worse. His examples are a restaurant that substituted cheaper cheese and a pediatrician practice bought by PE where patients can see the doctor less. These quality declines can open room for entrants who offer more service and quality. He also sees an opportunity in retiring baby-boomer owners who would rather sell to a successor who has worked in the business than to PE, which has a stigma, so the PE exit route is a real choice but has gaps for new operators.
“if private equity comes in and, say, find some opportunities to cut costs and maybe make the quality of the product less less favorable... And so I think there are some entry opportunities if private equity isn't doing well.”at 54:57
Prof G Markets: Meet The Millionaire Class That Really Runs America ·
Jon Gray · Blackstone
Private equity portfolio companies are growing revenue about 10% with margins expanding, driving strong earnings.
Gray points to Blackstone's private equity portfolio companies as evidence of underlying economic strength. They posted 10% revenue growth, margins continue to expand, and that combination produces very strong earnings growth. He argues this strength is what will eventually show through in better capital markets once the environment settles.
“Globally, our companies in private equity had 10% revenue growth. Margins continue to expand. And when you get that, you get that kind of very strong earnings growth.”at 4:49
Bloomberg Talks: Blackstone President & COO Jon Gray Talks AI Demand ·
Michael Ozanian · CNBC
Private equity buyers of NFL team stakes are a smart move; demand for NFL partnerships is tremendous.
Ozanian says demand to partner with the NFL, through ownership or on the business side, is tremendous. He notes the NFL is opening its ownership pool to more private equity firms. He calls General Atlantic's outside-investment move smart because it partners with the whole league rather than taking just 10% of one team. He cites the success of earlier investments such as 32 Equity.
“We've seen what's happened with 32 equity. We've seen the tremendous success these investments have. We don't want just 10% of a particular team. Here, we're basically partnering with the entire NFL.”at 36:57
Chris Whalen · Whalen Global Advisors LLC
Continuation vehicles show PE companies cannot sell their holdings, so holding periods are extended.
Whalen reads PE continuation vehicles as a sign that the companies private equity firms bought cannot be sold, so holding periods have to be extended. He says the quality of opportunities has declined as the industry has grown, and that continuation funds let bankers keep earning fees on what is effectively a failed investment. He says PE firms often sell assets to one another and pretend the assets are still good.
“Well, it means that the private equity companies that they underwrote can't be sold. And so they have to extend the time that they're gonna hold the investment.”at 14:38
The David Lin Report: Banks Face $500 Billion In Losses: Debt Bomb Strikes | Chris Whalen ·
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