Top Traders Unplugged · · 1h 1m

IL55: China Isn't Collapsing. It's Decaying ft. Logan Wright

With Logan Wright

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Summary

Logan Wright argues on Top Traders Unplugged that China's economy is decaying slowly rather than collapsing, because a banking system of roughly $74 trillion (about 60% of global GDP) cannot write down bad loans and keeps funding insolvent enterprises through low-margin lending. He traces the roots to the 2008 stimulus, which was channelled through state banks and locked in an investment-led model, and to the 2012-2016 shift of credit into shadow banking, after which defaults spread from peer-to-peer lending to property developers and mortgages. Wright says fiscal revenues tied to land sales have been flat since 2019 and that local-government incentives drive overcapacity, which pushes excess output into exports and deflates the real exchange rate. He doubts official GDP, pointing to growth stuck at 5% despite deflation and the property collapse, and treats credit data as the more reliable signal. He closes by arguing that the West is facing de-industrialisation risk and is wasting its collective demand leverage against China's supply-chain behaviour.

Key takeaways

  • Logan Wright on China's economy: The 2008 stimulus, funded through banks rather than fiscal spending, created an unchecked credit expansion.
  • Logan Wright on China's economy: Credit growth has slowed from 18% to 5%, and the deleveraging cascade has spread from the periphery to the center.
  • Logan Wright on China's economy: China is decaying rather than collapsing: insolvent firms keep getting credit because banks cannot recapitalize.
  • Logan Wright on China's economy: China's reported 5% growth is implausible; official GDP data is too stable and too strong to trust.
  • Logan Wright on China's economy: China's export surge is driven by its domestic slowdown; the real exchange rate has fallen about 20%.

What was said, by company and theme

13 views from 1 speaker. Every quote is checked against the episode's transcript (how).

China's economy

Where everyone stands on China's economy

  • Logan Wright · Rhodium Group

    China's growth policy is reactive, not the product of a coherent long-term plan.

    Long-term plans in China conflict with one another, and revealed preferences show which ones win, so there is no overall design. Long-term plans are also redefined often. Wright's review of two decades of economic policy finds everything appears more reactive than proactive. He cites the largest single-country credit expansion in over a century, adding about a third of global GDP in new credit in eight years, as something that was in no one's long-term plan. Shadow-bank lending and the equity boom and bust were also not planned, though they were accepted as political trade-offs.

    “Everything appears far more reactive than proactive.”at 8:13
  • Logan Wright · Rhodium Group

    The 2008 stimulus, funded through banks rather than fiscal spending, created an unchecked credit expansion.

    After the global financial crisis, China launched a roughly 4 trillion yuan stimulus, about 10% of GDP, but funded it mainly through state banks rather than the budget. Relaxing the firm limits on credit growth let credit expand much faster. Local governments moved to the commanding heights of the economy and could hold Beijing hostage. The stimulus turned the financial system into a shock absorber for bad investments. It also created a path-dependent, investment-led growth model. Wright argues this was a deliberate choice to err toward more credit rather than less, and that Beijing could have fiscalized the debt at any point.

    “What happened with the banks is that you don't... You relax these firm limits on credit growth that you had put in place. So it actually expands much faster because local governments sort of then move to the commanding heights of the economy.”at 16:54
  • Logan Wright · Rhodium Group

    Output-based tax sharing drives local governments to build overcapacity regardless of final demand.

    China charges heavily on value added tax, which is split roughly 50-50 between central and local governments, and on corporate income tax. It charges little on domestic consumption or individual income. Local officials are therefore rewarded for output and for keeping value added within their jurisdiction. They want to build not just a manufacturer but also the downstream firm that buys its output. This naturally leads to overcapacity. Investment is funded by local banks, which are secondary fiscal institutions for local governments, without regard for where final demand comes from.

    “you want to build the company that's gonna buy that manufacturer and use that as an input. And then you want to capture as much of that revenue possible. That naturally leads to overcapacity.”at 24:06
  • Logan Wright · Rhodium Group

    Credit growth has slowed from 18% to 5%, and the deleveraging cascade has spread from the periphery to the center.

    Between 2012 and 2016 the funding of the financial system shifted from stable deposits to non-deposit instruments such as wealth management products. The marginal loan moved outside the formal banking system, to property developers, local government financing vehicles and asset managers. Beijing moved to remove the funding-side risk by bringing these products back on balance sheet. That swapped a liability risk for a credit risk, since about half the borrowers lost access to credit. Defaults then cascaded from peer-to-peer lending in 2018 to small banks, trust companies, property developers in 2021 and mortgages in 2022. Credit growth averaged 18% from 2003 to 2016, 9% from 2017 to 2024, and is now about 5%.

    “So you start to see credit growth, you know, average 18% from 2003 to 2016. It averages 9% from 2017 to 2024. We're now at five.”at 30:16
  • Logan Wright · Rhodium Group

    China's fiscal capacity is eroding as land-sale revenue stalls while deficits keep widening.

    Investment depends on credit, and that credit funds fiscal revenues fed back through land sales. As credit growth slows and the property sector weakens, those revenues erode. Fiscal revenues, including land sales, have been basically flat since 2019 while deficits have expanded. This leaves the fiscal system unable to respond to the same pressures that the financial system faces. Wright argues the last mile of fiscal policy is still clogged with debt, so stimulus is less effective.

    “So fiscal revenues have been basically flat if you include land sales since 2019, and the deficits have expanded.”at 30:52
  • Logan Wright · Rhodium Group

    China is decaying rather than collapsing: insolvent firms keep getting credit because banks cannot recapitalize.

    Chinese banks lend at relatively low rates and earn relatively low net interest margins, so the system is very unprofitable. Banks can only recapitalize out of retained earnings, and if those earnings are constrained too much, the economy cannot keep being funded. The system is too large to write down bad loans; banking assets are about $74 trillion, roughly 60% of global GDP. As a result, the system has to keep lending to the same insolvent enterprises. Wright concludes this produces slow decay, not a crisis or collapse.

    “And therefore, you have to keep lending to the same insolvent enterprises, and that's decay. It's not crisis or collapse. It's decay.”at 31:56
  • Logan Wright · Rhodium Group

    China's balance-sheet problem differs from Japan's because Chinese firms are not cash-flow positive.

    Kevin Coldiron offered Japan's balance-sheet recession as an analogy. Wright agrees that firms cannot pay down debt from retained earnings if their margins are very low. The key difference is that Japanese firms stayed cash-flow positive, so they kept operating and deleveraged over time. Monetary policy was ineffective because weak credit demand needed fiscal support. In China, fiscal policy is more constrained, and the central bank can only allocate credit to particular firms in a targeted way. It cannot provide broad countercyclical support because so many entities are constrained.

    “Maybe that's the difference between Chinese firms and Japanese firms. I was gonna highlight exactly that. I mean, the Japanese firms were still operating cash flow positive.”at 32:48
  • Logan Wright · Rhodium Group

    China's reported 5% growth is implausible; official GDP data is too stable and too strong to trust.

    Beijing does not behave as if it believes its own data. After the September 2024 Gansu visit, officials launched a wave of stimulus (rate cuts, an equity support facility, a 10 trillion yuan local government debt swap) while official growth stayed exactly on its 5% target. Either Beijing is unaware of conditions or the data don't reflect them, and Wright thinks the latter. The GDP series was too stable between 2014 and 2019 and has been too strong since 2022 given the property adjustment. An investment-dependent economy growing 5% real over three years with deflation is something he says has never been seen. Adding up expenditure-side components on a good-faith basis gives a far weaker picture, consistent with a sharp drop in investment from the property collapse, widening trade imbalances and deflation. He notes the trade pushback against China would not exist if growth were really 5%. Wright says the financial system data is the most useful signal, since credit slowdowns force investment to slow.

    “Simply put, we have never seen an economy that is investment dependent have 5% real growth over three years with three years of deflation.”at 41:21
  • Logan Wright · Rhodium Group

    Beijing's 'inevitable growth' narrative is strategic propaganda aimed at keeping partners and sanctions-hit trade going.

    The perception that China is growing faster than everyone else and will inevitably rise in influence serves Beijing's diplomacy. If countries are to keep de-risking and building alternative supply chains, or to keep trading with China despite sanctions and export controls, China needs a domestic economy that everyone believes is growing. Raw-material exporters are encouraged to sell to China on the belief it will be a long-term reliable buyer, which is part of why the narrative matters. Beijing is now redefining economic success away from GDP and toward technological achievements. Wright argues that this narrative is Beijing's most important propaganda message and that it will not go away soon.

    “the perception of China's inevitable growth and inevitable rise in influences... The most important propaganda message that Beijing has.”at 47:57
  • Logan Wright · Rhodium Group

    China's export surge is driven by its domestic slowdown; the real exchange rate has fallen about 20%.

    Trade shocks are usually blamed on trade and industrial policy, but Wright argues the domestic slowdown is the real driver. The property sector used to provide final demand, and the industrial ecosystem built around it now has to find buyers abroad. State-owned credit keeps that output going to prevent a collapse, so the excess is pushed into exports. Deflationary pressure lowers China's real exchange rate, which has depreciated about 20% over four years regardless of the nominal rate. Competing in emerging markets is a price contest rather than a technology one, so market share depends on falling prices. Exports are migrating from consumer electronics into upstream industrial goods and into European manufacturing. Because the political economy stops weak firms from going bankrupt, there is little real upgrading up the value chain, just a rise in global export share.

    “The missing part of this story is that we think about the China shocks as the byproduct of trade and industrial policies, and they are. But the domestic slowdown is what's driving this.”at 49:45

Banks

Where everyone stands on Banks

  • Logan Wright · Rhodium Group

    A full Chinese banking recapitalization is unlikely, so bad-loan losses will keep being slowly deferred.

    Recognising the losses would mean trillions of dollars of write-offs, and the NPL ratio is either 5% or 15%. Few Chinese banks can raise external capital, and the weakest are not the ones that could. Doing a good-bank/bad-bank split domestically still requires funding the bad bank, and it is unclear what a recapitalization would deliver in credit flow or who it would benefit. It would also mean admitting a serious problem with the growth model. The system instead relies on incremental recapitalizations (a recent one of about $54 billion was too small to move overall credit growth) and structural lending tools from the central bank, used since 2014. Local governments won't disclose where the bad assets are, because they fear having to pay for them. Beijing's attempts to make localities cut debt slow local investment, and clarifying bailouts reveals more debt, so the dilemma has persisted for about a decade.

    “whether the NPL ratio is really 5% or 15%, because that still involves trillions of dollars of write offs, and no one really wants to participate in that.”at 36:10

Tariffs & trade policy

Where everyone stands on Tariffs & trade policy

  • Logan Wright · Rhodium Group

    China treats global trade imbalances as part of its growth strategy, offering only more Chinese investment as a fix.

    China is about 26% of global investment but only about 12% of global consumption, so it can only grow as fast as its customers unless it displaces their investment. As long as the domestic economy stays imbalanced, China's trading exposure means it has to keep taking investment share from others. Wright argues that policymakers used to see global imbalances as temporary and to be corrected with policy to avoid crises. China instead treats their expansion as part of its growth model. The only remedy it offers is more inbound investment from China itself, which makes the global imbalance debate far more contentious. European trade restrictions against China are starting to intensify, though the pushback has been modest so far.

    “China views the expansion of global imbalances as a part of its growth strategy”at 52:50

US–China relations

Where everyone stands on US–China relations

  • Logan Wright · Rhodium Group

    The West has more leverage over China than it uses; the threat is deindustrialization, not China overtaking the US.

    The challenge from China is now different from four or five years ago. The threat is de-industrialization that goes past the red lines of resilience in Western industrial structures. Defending industries before they go bankrupt is much easier than rebuilding them later. This is not a long-term systemic rivalry in which China overtakes the US as the largest economy, since China at 60% to 90% of US GDP will not reach 150% or 200%. The task is to change Chinese behaviour around weaponising supply chains, and to make that behaviour deterrable. The West could use its demand leverage far better if it acted collectively against China's supply constraints. Wright sees the US trade war with its allies as having wasted leverage, and says the West is not using the leverage it has to change Chinese behaviour.

    “But right now, the West is not using the leverage it has to sort of change Chinese behavior in the same way.”at 56:05

Topics

  • 2008 stimulus and credit expansion
  • China bank recapitalization
  • GDP data reliability
  • Japan comparison and balance-sheet repair
  • Western derisking strategy
  • bank recapitalization and zombie lending
  • credit growth slowdown and shadow banking
  • export surge and trade surpluses
  • global trade imbalances
  • growth narrative as propaganda
  • local government fiscal revenue and land sales
  • local government investment and overcapacity
  • policy making and long-term planning

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