What podcasters are saying about US–China relations

Summary

In the past 30 days, 4 speakers on 3 finance podcasts discussed US–China relations in 5 views. Chorus has followed US–China relations since September 25, 2026: 7 views from 5 speakers on 3 shows.

Who talks about it most

• Brent Johnson · 2
• Michael Every · 2
• Joel Salatin · 1
• Anas Alhajji · 1
• R.P. Eddy · 1

The latest views

Newest first. Every quote is checked against the episode's transcript.

• Joel Salatin · Polyface Farm

  China's 2030 food import-independence push will keep it from buying US soybeans and feedstocks.

  Salatin says China has an internal plan to be food and feedstock import independent by 2030. After China halted soybean imports, it relented under US trade pressure and bought some, but he argues the 2030 goal still amounts to a moratorium on imported feedstocks, especially from the US. With 2030 only a few seasons away, he expects weaker demand for US soybeans and grains.

  “But China has an internal projection sheet that they want to be completely food independent by 2030, food import independent by 2030, including grains and feedstocks.”at 11:12

  Wealthion: Where Joel Salatin Would Invest $1 Million in Agriculture · October 27, 2026

• Anas Alhajji · Energy Outlook Advisors

  China is exploiting Hormuz and Red Sea disruption to advance the Belt and Road and an Arctic route with Russia.

  Anas argues China wants Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb to stay closed or semi-closed because disruption benefits the Belt and Road. He points to a news report on China and Russia advancing Arctic maritime cooperation, linking the Maritime Silk Road with a Trans-Arctic corridor. He presents it as an alternative to Hormuz, Malacca, Bab el-Mandeb and the Panama Canal. He adds that China-Russia northern-route oil trade is near record highs. This is his interpretation, and he presents it as a strategic read rather than hard evidence.

  “I think that China at this stage is looking at the Hormuz crisis and the Three Seas crisis and say, okay, how I can take advantage of that?”at 35:09

  MacroVoices: MacroVoices #554 Dr. Anas Alhajji + Louis-Vincent Gave: Developing Crises in Middle-East and France · October 22, 2026

• Brent Johnson · Santiago Capital

  The US is embarking on a Cold War with China, which will not end soon and is a better analog than the 1970s.

  After World War II the US had large debt from financing the war and then began a Cold War with Russia. Brent sees the US embarking on a similar Cold War with China now. He does not want it, but he would prefer a cold war to a hot war, and does not see it ending anytime soon. He thinks the late 1940s into the 1950s is a better analog for today than the 1970s, which many people use because they expect a strongly inflationary period. The analogy comes from debt, great power rivalry and the post-war setting.

  “And I kind of feel like that's what we're embarking on now. We're embarking on this great cold war with China.”at 33:14

  MacroVoices: MacroVoices #553 Brent Johnson: Disparate Housewives · October 8, 2026

• Brent Johnson · Santiago Capital

  US–China power competition will last decades and force countries to choose sides; no resolution in six to nine months.

  Brent argues great power competition with China will force countries, regions or blocs to take sides, because few nations can stay on the sidelines. He is unsure whether the split ends as a China-only contest or a bloc contest, but expects it to run for years, if not decades, and not come to a head in the next six to nine months. He frames it as a pendulum shift: globalization ran for 30 to 40 years and the pendulum will now swing back toward blocs for a similar stretch. He also says China is an extremely formidable adversary, so a US win is not automatic.

  “I think regardless of which one it is, I think this probably plays out for... a number of years, if not a number of decades. I don't see this all coming to a head in the next six to nine months”at 36:48

  MacroVoices: MacroVoices #553 Brent Johnson: Disparate Housewives · October 8, 2026

• R.P. Eddy · Ergo

  US-China relations are structurally adversarial; the current truce is a false peace likely to break around 2028.

  Eddy says the US and China are in an unfixable confrontation over Taiwan, Tibet-type human rights issues, democracy, and trade, and that China's economy depends on trade practices that hurt the US. He argues the Busan truce is an enforced false peace. Both sides are constrained: China's rare earth leverage keeps America from hitting China too hard, while US leverage on aircraft parts and AI keeps China in check. He expects the truce to hold until the Taiwan election, whose result will show where China goes on Taiwan, and says the relationship could blow up around the US general election. Eddy advises corporate clients to scrutinise China dependencies closely.

  “We think that we're in a sort of a forced doldier we're in a false peace until the Taiwanese election... we think it really could end up blowing up towards the time of the U. S. General election.”at 43:14

  On The Tape with Danny Moses: R.P. Eddy: Don't Ignore The Cassandras · October 7, 2026

• Michael Every · Rabobank

  Serious national security circles see Xi possibly moving on Taiwan next year, though this is unconfirmed.

  Michael says there are serious discussions in national security circles that Xi Jinping is deadly serious about past statements and would consider moving on Taiwan next year. He notes the idea is not new and that no one knows whether it is true. If it happened, the worst case would be a US–China clash in Asia on top of the Ukraine and Middle East wars, which he describes as a small-scale world war. He links this to US weakness: interceptor shortages and limited bunker fuel for the Pacific fleet, which give China home advantage. He frames the US choice as either a deal with China or making a Chinese move strategically unviable.

  “That Xi Jinping is deadly serious about past statements he's made and that he would consider moving on Taiwan next year.”at 24:14

  MacroVoices: MacroVoices #551 Michael Every: Decoding The Global Geopolitical Puzzle (Part 2) · September 25, 2026

• Michael Every · Rabobank

  Trump's refusal to extend the China trade truce past early January suggests the US sees a coming card to play.

  At the last summit the US agreed a trade truce under which tariffs on China are lower than before, and China was not punished as harshly as expected. China asked at this summit for the truce to run through the end of Trump's term, but Trump would only extend it until early January. Michael asks why the US would refuse, and suggests it may expect a shift in its position over the next few months. He speculates that new AI or mineral processing technology could reduce China's leverage, though he admits this is outside his expertise.

  “And this time, China asked to have that trade truce extended all the way through to the end of Trump's term. And Trump turned around and said, no. We only want to do it until early January.”at 32:48

  MacroVoices: MacroVoices #551 Michael Every: Decoding The Global Geopolitical Puzzle (Part 2) · September 25, 2026