Capital Allocators · · 1h 11m
[REPLAY] Paul Enright – Inside Long-Short Equity Investing (Capital Allocators, EP.266)
With Paul Enright
Summary
Paul Enright, a long-short equity investor, reflects on how the zero-rate era made nearly every stock rise, leading investors to mistake risk-free rates for business quality. He argues that passive flows, multi-manager pod crowding, and changed trading plumbing have reduced engaged ownership and raised trading costs. He examines long-short drawdowns, noting that longs drive losses in falling markets, and explains why moderate-net strategies struggle to scale because large shorts become risky and big funds stop shorting. He also describes managing gross exposure against alpha spreads, praises Citadel's neutral multi-manager model despite its challenges, and expects hedge fund assets to keep concentrating among large managers.
Key takeaways
- Paul Enright on US rates & the Fed: Near-zero rates lifted all stocks, so investors wrongly concluded business quality alone drives returns.
- Paul Enright on Asset managers, brokers & exchanges: Hedge fund longs fell 50-60% in a market down 30%; shorts did little to offset, exposing a bull-market strategy.
- Paul Enright (bullish on Citadel): Citadel's neutral multi-manager model is killing it, with capital scaling up after strong performance.
- Paul Enright on Market sentiment, positioning & volatility: Passive ownership and crowded pods have changed market plumbing, raising trading costs and crowding into the same good businesses.
- Paul Enright on Asset managers, brokers & exchanges: Moderate-net long-short funds work at $1-3B but big funds can't scale, since large shorts risk squeezes.
What was said, by company and theme
8 views from 1 speaker. Every quote is checked against the episode's transcript (how).
Citadel
Paul Enright · Krainos CapitalBullish
Citadel's neutral multi-manager model is killing it, with capital scaling up after strong performance.
Enright credits the neutral model as the reason Citadel is succeeding. He notes that the main criticism of the model is that the better a pod performs, the more gross exposure Citadel wants to allocate to it. He describes a case where a team produced a 13% spread in a quarter and was offered two more billion dollars of risk even though it wanted to reduce gross. He presents this as hard to manage rather than as a flaw in the model, so his overall view of the model is positive.
“there's a reason why Citadel's killing it. The only criticism I ever hear about the Citadel model is the better I do, the more gross they want to give me.”at 38:35
Asset managers, brokers & exchanges
Where everyone stands on Asset managers, brokers & exchanges
Paul Enright · Krainos Capital
Hedge fund longs fell 50-60% in a market down 30%; shorts did little to offset, exposing a bull-market strategy.
Enright argues that recent hedge fund drawdowns come from the structure of long-short books. Hedge fund longs are on average down 50-60% while the market is down about 30%, and shorts either don't exist or are only down about 10%. Shorting gets attention, but the strategy is built to be long stocks that can rise 50% and short stocks that move roughly ±10%, so in a falling market the longs drive losses. He says this is a bull-market strategy: when longs fall and the shorts keep doing the same thing, managers conclude there was no dispersion, when there was dispersion. He sees this as how managers get trapped.
“hedge fund longs are on average down 50 or 60% in a market that's down 30 and shorts either don't exist or the shorts are down like 10.”at 37:06
Paul Enright · Krainos Capital
Hedge fund assets will keep concentrating in a few large managers unless something decentralizes the industry.
Enright says the definition of success in hedge funds has shifted from returns to AUM, fundraising and deal flow, which points to assets continuing to centralize among large managers. He describes the industry as a roughly $4-5 trillion universe in which long-short is a small part, and argues that the largest managers will keep gathering assets. He qualifies this with 'unless something happens on the side to decentralize it,' so the view is conditional and not a firm forecast.
“the assets are going to continue to be centralized unless something happens on the side to decentralize it.”at 1:03:26
Paul Enright · Krainos Capital
Moderate-net long-short funds work at $1-3B but big funds can't scale, since large shorts risk squeezes.
Enright says a moderate-net long-short book at $1-3B of capital should still perform very well. Scale is the problem. Funds that earned most alpha from shorts when small keep shorting at larger size, and a squeeze on a 14% short position can be fatal, unlike a 1% position. He recalls how a single idea (Volkswagen) hurt his fund in 2008. Large funds then stop shorting, leaving gross long exposure at 85-95%, so the best ideas are not fully deployed. Enright says the moderate-net model with spread and alpha has an opportunity but does not scale, and he doesn't know a solution beyond staying nimble.
“The long short moderate to mediocre net at like a billion to $3,000,000,000 of capital should still do really really well. It should.”at 1:04:33
Market sentiment, positioning & volatility
Where everyone stands on Market sentiment, positioning & volatility
Paul Enright · Krainos Capital
Long-short spreads are cyclical; managers should cut gross after blowouts and add when spreads compress too far.
Enright argues that alpha spreads do not compound forever. They behave like an accordion, compressing and expanding over time. When a fund produces strong spread, its expected return on new ideas is worth comparing with the current spread, and managers should reduce gross if future expected returns on longs and shorts fall, and add gross when spreads blow out or go too far in the other direction. He gives an example: after 20 points of spread in six months with longs screening at only 15% upside and shorts flat, a 200 gross book should drop toward 160. He says this happens historically at least once or twice a year.
“because spreads in accordion, Like it doesn't get captured forever and continue to grow. It will compress and it'll ebb and flow and the key is to be front foot when it's blowing out”at 39:48
Paul Enright · Krainos Capital
Passive ownership and crowded pods have changed market plumbing, raising trading costs and crowding into the same good businesses.
Passive capital now exceeds active flows, so there are fewer engaged owners. Fidelity once owned about 14% of the companies Enright covered, but Vanguard now holds large stakes and no one comes to sit with management. Multi-manager pods are huge, with unclear leverage (one example: seven TMT teams managing $20B of risk inside one pod), and most managers want to own the same good businesses with less contrarianism, which produces crowding. The plumbing has also changed: fewer participants take risk off books, trades route through electronic venues, dark pools and dealers like Goldman or Morgan Stanley, and the all-in cost of trading size in specific stocks has risen, though many firms don't track it.
“Fidelity still owns a lot of the company but the companies are bigger and Vanguard has taken a lot of shares. So there's nobody showing up from Vanguard to sit next to you to have a conversation with a company.”at 46:35
US rates & the Fed
Where everyone stands on US rates & the Fed
Paul Enright · Krainos Capital
Near-zero rates lifted all stocks, so investors wrongly concluded business quality alone drives returns.
Paul argues that with rates near zero and all risk assets anchored to the zero bound, nearly every stock rose, so investors assumed business quality was the main driver. He says the risk-free rate was the most important input to returns over that long period, and this confusion led people to treat picking a stock as the same thing as picking a business. He also finds it ironic that people now complain of no dispersion, when dispersion was equally absent on the way up.
“with interest rates being so low and all risk assets being anchored to a zero bound, everybody just assumed that you could just think about business quality because everything went up... the most important input was what was the risk free rate doing for a really long period of time.”at 12:39
US housing
Where everyone stands on US housing
Paul Enright · Krainos Capital
Cheap land basis in parts of the US makes multifamily developments attractive for co-investing with trusted developers.
Enright spends about 20% of his time working with a dozen real estate developers to find strong multifamily projects where he can be a limited partner alongside developers he knows well. He targets parts of the country where the basis in land is very cheap. He has invested as an LP in these deals and says co-invest opportunities come up regularly, which he prefers to more labor-intensive work. The cheap land basis is his stated reason for focusing on these regions.
“trying to find amazing multifamily opportunities where I can be an LP with a group of folks that I'm closely affiliated with in parts of the country where the basis in the land is really cheap”at 54:29
Topics
- hedge fund industry asset concentration
- long-short fund drawdowns
- long-short fund scalability
- market structure and crowding
- multi-manager fund model
- multifamily development in low-land-cost regions
- rates and stock valuations
- stock dispersion and spreads
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