Wealthion · · 53 min
I Thought Oil Would Go to the Moon. I Was Wrong | Art Berman
With Art Berman
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Summary
Art Berman argues that the standard supply-demand balance model does not explain oil prices, since its correlation with price holds only during sharp demand shocks such as COVID-19 and the 2008 crisis. He favours a seasonal inventory measure, comparing current commercial stocks with the five-year average, which he says tracks price far better and shows a growing deficit that helps explain today's higher prices. On the Iran conflict he says markets are pricing a long duration and that the Strait of Hormuz disruption adds roughly $35 a barrel in logistics costs, while US output nears 14 million barrels a day and tankers keep finding routes. He also cites China's weaker refinery runs and falling imports as evidence of demand destruction, and expects a higher-for-longer period that eventually curbs demand, with a post-war glut forecast treated skeptically. He closes by noting the lack of new US refinery construction in about 30 years and suggesting integrated oil companies as a way to hold exposure to the whole system.
Key takeaways
- Art Berman on Oil & fuels: Supply-demand balance has shown zero correlation with oil prices over 25 years, so analysts' main model fails.
- Art Berman on Oil & fuels: Comparative inventory versus the five-year average tracks oil prices about 80% of the time, unlike supply-demand.
- Art Berman on Oil & fuels: The oil system is adaptable: US output is near record and higher prices bring marginal barrels and Gulf tanker workarounds.
- Art Berman on Oil & fuels: China's falling oil imports reflect weaker Chinese oil demand rather than EV substitution, which is too small to explain them.
- Art Berman on Oil & fuels: Hormuz shipping workarounds add roughly a $35 a barrel premium to oil prices.
What was said, by company and theme
17 views from 1 speaker. Every quote is checked against the episode's transcript (how).
Oil & fuels
Where everyone stands on Oil & fuels
Art Berman · Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
Supply-demand balance has shown zero correlation with oil prices over 25 years, so analysts' main model fails.
Berman says he tested supply, demand and supply-demand balance against price in his essay. Supply and demand correlate with price only in episodes like COVID in 2020 and the 2008 financial crisis, where demand was sharply shocked. Over a longer window, including the year before and after those episodes and the Ukraine war, the correlation disappears. He argues the model persists because it works sometimes and seems intuitively right, so people keep assuming it predicts price when it does not.
“Supply demand balance, which is probably the main approach that most analysts use, has zero correlation to price over the last twenty five years.”at 5:01
Art Berman · Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
Comparative inventory versus the five-year average tracks oil prices about 80% of the time, unlike supply-demand.
Berman's method, used for about 25 years, compares current commercial inventories (WTI, OECD, and similar) with the five-year average for the same week or month. A deficit is negative and a surplus positive. He argues markets trade on seasonal inventory position rather than absolute barrels, so this measure correlates strongly with price, working about 80% of the time versus about 1% for supply-demand balance. He acknowledges it is not perfect. Right now inventories are in deficit to the five-year average, though less than in 2022 during the Ukraine war, and the deficit is growing, which he says explains why prices are higher than in August. He adds that the Hormuz flow focus ignores stocks.
“It works about 80% of the time compared with supply and demand, which works about 1% of the time.”at 12:55
Art Berman · Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
Rebuilding oil inventories is essentially impossible while the geopolitical backdrop persists.
Asked whether the system can refill inventories against a prolonged Iran conflict, with Houthi attacks reportedly now hitting Saudi Arabia, Berman answers 'Zero' and says that is the problem. He argues that inventories are a stock that can be measured, so the failure to refill is a concrete drag on the market's buffer. He sees no realistic path to rebuilding stocks until the geopolitical situation changes.
“Zero. I mean, that's the problem.”at 16:55
Art Berman · Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
Strategic petroleum reserve drawdowns matter less to oil prices than people assume; the system is less sensitive to them.
Berman notes concern about the US drawing down its Strategic Petroleum Reserve and about the OECD releasing around 400 million barrels from collective reserves. He says these are measurable stocks, but he is not sure the US reserve is near tank bottoms, since nobody really knows where that point is. Oil has not risen to $150 or $200 despite the large drawdown, which he takes as evidence that the system does not respond to reserve levels the way humans expect. He admits he cannot say whether that is right or wrong, but says the observed outcome is the truth.
“the system doesn't care about strategic petroleum reserves as much as humans do.”at 18:28
Art Berman · Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
The oil system is adaptable: US output is near record and higher prices bring marginal barrels and Gulf tanker workarounds.
Berman says the system has buffers in reserves, commercial inventories and global production. US crude and condensate output has reached new records and is very close to 14 million barrels a day. Higher prices create a reinforcing feedback loop: producers drill more wells and bring marginally commercial oil to market, and this is happening quietly. Oil tankers are also finding ways out of the Persian Gulf. Tanker owners will not sit idle for months, and higher prices raise the incentive to take that risk, since their business is moving barrels. Berman uses this adaptability to explain why the Hormuz disruption has not produced a spike to $200.
“The US has reached new record levels of crude oil and condensate production while we weren't paying attention... we're very close to 14,000,000 barrels a day.”at 22:32
Art Berman · Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
China's falling oil imports reflect weaker Chinese oil demand rather than EV substitution, which is too small to explain them.
Berman says the most probable explanation for China's lower imports is simply weaker demand: China is using less oil. China's refinery runs are well down, and even after a slight rise this month they are still 8% lower year over year, so less crude is being processed and imported. Other explanations such as inventory use are possible but secondary. He argues EV substitution cannot explain the drop. China consumes around 16 million barrels a day, and he would be shocked if even 1 million barrels a day had been displaced by EVs, and EVs take time to scale. The EV story is an aspect but far from the whole.
“there's a big problem with Chinese demand. They're just using less oil, and there's data to support that.”at 25:19
Art Berman · Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
Underinvestment in new refineries reflects capital markets avoiding them, not a neutral fact; refining is one choke point among many.
Berman notes that no new refinery has been built in the US for about 30 years. He asks whether that is underinvestment or the capital markets sending a signal. He argues that for two decades the narrative of peak demand and the energy transition has made refineries unattractive, since they take billions and take thirty years to pay out, so investors would not put money into them. He says refineries are still being built in Nigeria, the Middle East and China, but mostly by state-funded oil companies, which is a different system where investors do not vote with their dollars. Refining is a real choke point, but only one part of the system.
“We haven't built a new refinery, say in The United States, for, I don't know, thirty years, something like that.”at 34:52
Art Berman · Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
Integrated oil companies, which control the whole system, would be the place to start researching energy investments.
Asked which energy investments look attractive from a systems view, Berman says he does not know for certain, but if he were talking to his adviser he would start with an integrated oil company he could buy shares in. Such a company owns and operates refineries, oil fields and distribution, so it sees the whole system, as in a vertically integrated organization. He adds that these firms are not perfect and that they look at a much bigger picture than individual investors do. He notes that managers have scenarios and skin in the game, while he and Maggie do not.
“I would think that an integrated oil company that I could buy shares in would be a place to start investigating.”at 38:47
Art Berman · Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
Hormuz shipping workarounds add roughly a $35 a barrel premium to oil prices.
Berman's simplest explanation for why oil is higher since his last appearance is the cost of moving oil around the Strait of Hormuz disruption. The system is shuttling oil between tankers, some tankers are being hit, more tankers than usual are in use, routes are much longer, and there is more redundancy. All of that adds cost, which he estimates at roughly a $35 a barrel premium. He says the change in price since the last conversation is essentially the added cost of getting oil where it needs to go, and that the adaptation has not been free.
“the simplest reason or way to understand higher oil prices is all those things have contributed a premium to oil price, which is roughly $35 a barrel.”at 43:53
Art Berman · Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
Singapore's $200 diesel spike reflects local logistics scarcity, not the global oil price.
Berman says the high Singapore diesel price that people cite is not the 'right' oil price. It is a local scarcity problem that has several causes but comes mainly from logistics. Oil is not reaching the right place at the right time, and that raises the local price. He treats regional product prices as a result of distribution frictions, not a sign of what crude should cost.
“That's a local scarcity problem that exists for a variety of reasons, but exists principally because of logistics.”at 44:55
Art Berman · Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
Futures prices are reliable for hedging, so criticism that they understate the real oil price misses their purpose.
Berman pushes back on the claim that futures prices are misleading and cannot be trusted because the real cost of oil is higher. Futures serve a different purpose, mainly hedging for oil companies. He says that asking which 'real' oil price is meant depends on the location and product. Each oil price serves a different function, so criticism of futures for not matching other prices is misplaced.
“futures prices are for hedging among other things... they serve a very important purpose.”at 45:58
Art Berman · Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
Calls for a post-war oil glut are unreliable, since a glut was also predicted before this war and failed.
Berman disagrees with the view, raised by other panelists, that once the war ends oil will move into a glut. He points out that a glut was also expected just before this war, and that the call rested on supply and demand alone. He says that approach has not worked and treats a post-war glut as another forecast built on a framework that misses how the system adapts.
“once this war is over... then we're gonna have a glut. Well, we've been there before... we were supposed to have had a glut just before this war. Based on what? Supply and demand.”at 47:02
Art Berman · Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
Adaptation complexity, redundancy and inefficiency keep oil prices rising regardless of the supply-demand balance.
Berman argues that supply-demand balance does not explain oil prices now. The system has adapted, and that adaptation adds complexity, redundancy and inefficiency. As long as those persist, prices go up whatever the supply and demand balance is. Price only stops rising when enough buyers reduce use, and buyers have different price thresholds, so price is set by where demand falls off rather than by the balance itself.
“as long as our adaptation introduces complexity, which it does, redundancy, which it does, and inefficiency, which it does, the price is gonna go up no matter what the supply and the demand balance is.”at 47:43
Art Berman · Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
Higher oil prices persist until enough buyers use less, and a 1980s-style price slump could follow.
Berman says the market is in a higher-for-longer situation until it is not. At some price, enough people cut back that demand falls. He draws a loose analogy to the 1980s and early 1990s. After the 1970s and early 1980s oil shocks, prices stayed low for about fifteen years alongside a weak global economy. He is not saying this will repeat exactly, but he thinks the pattern may rhyme because people will not keep paying more than they have to.
“at some point, the price is high enough that enough people use less that demand goes down.”at 48:23
China's economy
Where everyone stands on China's economy
Art Berman · Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
Doom forecasts for China's economy have been consistently wrong over 20 years; slowing is natural as it grows.
Berman says he has read many doom analyses claiming China's economy is in deep trouble because of too much debt, and while those points have truth, the forecasts have been consistently wrong for two decades. China's slowdown is partly the natural result of getting big, and China still runs around 4% plus GDP growth, which the US would welcome. He argues China has a different economic model and is willing to run up debt to dominate global supply chains, a deliberate strategy that many people misunderstand.
“all of those forecasts have been consistently wrong over the last twenty years.”at 28:54
Art Berman · Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
China's falling oil imports look like demand destruction, possibly unrelated to the Gulf war.
Berman uses China as a case history of demand destruction. China has cut oil consumption for reasons that may or may not relate to the Persian Gulf war. He estimates the cut at a few million barrels a day. If every country cut consumption as much as China has, the effect on price would be very large and prices would fall sharply. He presents China as an example of how high prices can eventually reduce demand.
“What if China is the poster child of what demand destruction looks like for reasons that may or may not have anything to do with the Persian Gulf War.”at 48:44
Middle East & Iran
Where everyone stands on Middle East & Iran
Art Berman · Labyrinth Consulting Services, Inc.
Markets now expect the Iran conflict to last longer than hoped, and that is feeding into oil price expectations.
In August many people expected the conflict to end soon, and Trump kept saying a deal was close. Berman says smart observers now think resolution is unlikely soon, that the probability is against it, and that talks are not even happening. He argues this market view is itself information. As more investors and analysts adopt a longer-conflict view, it shifts how they think about future oil prices, so the expected duration is what feeds into current pricing.
“We've gotten to a point now where smart people and markets have said, you know what? We're not gonna solve this anytime soon.”at 15:27
Topics
- China growth and debt outlook
- China oil demand
- Iran conflict duration
- Strait of Hormuz logistics premium
- demand destruction and long-run oil prices
- integrated oil companies
- oil demand and imports
- oil futures prices
- oil inventories and prices
- oil inventory rebuilding
- oil price drivers
- oil price drivers beyond supply and demand
- oil supply response
- post-war oil glut
- refining capacity
- regional diesel prices
- strategic petroleum reserves and prices
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