The Real Eisman Playbook · · 29 min

Steve Eisman Reveals the Truth About 'The Big Short'…

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Summary

Steve Eisman recounts how his team identified and shorted the weakest parts of the US subprime mortgage market before 2008. He explains the mechanics of teaser-rate loans that reset to roughly triple payments, which only worked while home prices rose and refinancing stayed open, and how early delinquency data from 2006 deals, with about 50% no-doc or low-doc loans, flagged the coming losses. He describes how tranched securitizations and credit default swaps, including AIG's exposure, spread the damage up to triple-A paper and forced government intervention, and how banks returned failed sample loans while securitizing the unreviewed remainder. He concludes that post-Dodd-Frank leverage cuts at banks such as Citigroup have made the regulated system safer, though risky lending instincts may simply migrate to less-regulated vehicles.

Key takeaways

  • Steve Eisman on US housing: Subprime delinquencies were rising sharply by vintage, a clear warning the market ignored.
  • Steve Eisman on US housing: Subprime teaser loans were underwritten at 3% teaser rates, setting borrowers up to fail at resets.
  • Steve Eisman on Credit markets: AAA subprime tranches were far less safe than rated; losses hit 50% versus the 7-10% models assumed.
  • Steve Eisman on Credit markets: Subprime bond demand collapsed in mid-2007 when even European buyers stopped, freezing the refinancing chain.
  • Steve Eisman on Credit markets: Credit default swaps grew to multi-trillions and interconnected firms so tightly they threatened the global economy.

What was said, by company and theme

8 views from 1 speaker. Every quote is checked against the episode's transcript (how).

US housing

Where everyone stands on US housing

  • Steve Eisman · The Real Eisman Playbook

    Subprime lending was a repeat of a failed cycle that grew to $600B in 2006 and would end badly.

    In 1998 Eisman called the bankruptcy of eight subprime lenders at an Oppenheimer meeting, and they failed, because their accounting did not work. Around 2002, a second generation of subprime lenders such as New Century, NovaStar and Accredited Home Lenders went public, and many executives were the same people from the first wave. He expected the same tragic third act. He admits he underestimated scale: by 2006 the industry originated $600B in mortgages in one year, about 20% of the US mortgage market.

    “It's three acts. Act three is always a tragedy, and I knew it would end badly again.”at 2:51
  • Steve Eisman · The Real Eisman Playbook

    Subprime delinquencies were rising sharply by vintage, a clear warning the market ignored.

    Eisman's team bought monthly loan-level performance data that issuers reported to the rating agencies and compared securitizations of the same age. At month six, the 30-day delinquency rate was about 0.75% for 2004 deals versus about 4% and climbing for 2006 deals. A second signal agreed: the share of no-doc or low-doc loans in the pools reached around 50% by 2006. A seasonal dip in delinquencies in March and April 2007 came from tax refunds used to catch up on payments, not from better loans, and it reversed by summer.

    “In 2004, that delinquency number might have been three quarters of 1%. By 2006, same month, same loan age, it's four percent and climbing.”at 5:39
  • Steve Eisman · The Real Eisman Playbook

    Subprime teaser loans were underwritten at 3% teaser rates, setting borrowers up to fail at resets.

    Standard subprime loans from 2002 to mid-2007 carried a 3% teaser rate for two years, then reset to LIBOR plus 6%, roughly 9% with LIBOR at 3%, so payments about tripled. Lenders qualified borrowers only on the teaser payment, so they knew on day one many could not afford the reset. Lenders then called borrowers near reset and refinanced them into new teasers, adding fees and balance each time, so borrowers never paid principal down. The model worked only while home prices rose and refinancing stayed available. Eisman says his team shorted this exposure and that the structure was precarious.

    “But this is the crazy part. The lender only qualifies you for that loan based on your ability to pay the 3% teaser rate, not the nine percent.”at 7:57

Credit markets

Where everyone stands on Credit markets

  • Steve Eisman · The Real Eisman Playbook

    AAA subprime tranches were far less safe than rated; losses hit 50% versus the 7-10% models assumed.

    Subprime securitizations were sliced into tranches, with losses hitting the bottom floors first and the triple-A top tranche protected by about 30% of subordination. The models assumed a pool would lose roughly 7-10% cumulatively. During the crisis, losses reached about 50%, so the flood reached the top floors. Triple-A paper held by pension funds and insurers was therefore not safe, only slower to fail. Eisman's team profited by shorting these securities.

    “The models assumed a subprime pool would lose maybe seven to 10% cumulative. During the crisis, losses hit 50%,”at 11:51
  • Steve Eisman · The Real Eisman Playbook

    Subprime bond demand collapsed in mid-2007 when even European buyers stopped, freezing the refinancing chain.

    Subprime loans were refinanced into new teasers because Wall Street could keep selling the resulting bonds, and European buyers such as German regional banks, referred to as Dusseldorf, bought much of that paper. By summer 2007 loan quality had degraded so far that Dusseldorf stopped buying. With no buyers, Wall Street could not sell bonds and stopped buying loans from originators. Originators then stopped lending, and borrowers approaching reset lost the ability to refinance, so the whole securitization chain choked up.

    “But by the summer of two thousand and seven, loan quality had degraded so far that even Dusseldorf stopped buying. No buyers meant Wall Street simply couldn't sell the bonds.”at 19:09
  • Steve Eisman · The Real Eisman Playbook

    Credit default swaps grew to multi-trillions and interconnected firms so tightly they threatened the global economy.

    Eisman describes how credit default swaps let investors bet on bonds they did not own, and he bought CDS on subprime securitizations. The CDS market grew to multi-trillions, big enough to sink the global economy, and it linked large firms' balance sheets in a web no one could untangle. AIG had sold billions of CDS to many counterparties, so doubts about AIG's ability to pay threatened everyone holding its promises. That chain reaction forced the government to step in.

    “the size of the credit default swap market reached into the multi trillions. It was big enough to sink the global economy.”at 20:42

Banks

Where everyone stands on Banks

  • Steve Eisman · The Real Eisman Playbook

    Issuers securitized unreviewed loan pools after sample reviews showed high failure rates; he calls it fraud.

    Buyers of loan pools could review a statistical sample of about 10%. By 2006 and 2007, 30-40% of sampled loans failed agreed underwriting standards. Firms returned the bad sample loans to the lender for their money back, then securitized the other 90% of the pool without reviewing it, knowing a similar share was likely bad, and disclosed only a vague line in the prospectus. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission referred the practice to the Department of Justice as looking like fraud, and Eisman says nothing happened.

    “failed to meet the underwriting standards everyone had agreed to. But here's what would happen. The firms would kick back that bad sample back to the lender”at 22:49
  • Steve Eisman · The Real Eisman Playbook

    Big bank leverage fell sharply after Dodd-Frank; he says banks are safer than at any point in his career.

    Dodd-Frank in 2010 put big-bank supervision under a single Fed vice chair role, ending regulator shopping. Leverage at large banks came down fast: Citigroup went from about 40-to-1 before the crisis to about 10-to-1. Eisman argues that reckless mortgage underwriting hidden inside the regulated banking system is much less likely now, so the system is safer than at any point in his career. He adds that the risky instinct moves to new containers that regulators have not yet fenced.

    “Leverage at the big banks came down fast. A bank like Citigroup went from something like 40 to one leverage before the crisis to 10 to one.”at 25:53

Topics

  • bank leverage and regulation
  • credit default swap systemic risk
  • securitization loan sampling
  • subprime lending cycle
  • subprime mortgage delinquencies
  • subprime mortgage structure
  • subprime securitization demand
  • subprime securitization loss assumptions

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